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A considerable amount of work has been done on the relationship between AFDC benefits and
family structure in the United States. The evidence to date—based on cross-state variation in welfare
benefits and family structure, often with state fixed effects—indicates that there is some nonzero effect
of those benefits on marriage and fertility, although disagreement remains about the magnitude of the
effect. It is undisputed, however, that time-series trends in family structure are not correlated in the
direction that the cross-state evidence would suggest, because real benefits have been falling, even
relative to wages, in aggregate time series. This paper reexamines the time-series evidence with particular
attention to the role of wages in explaining trends in headship, and notes that the correct specification
includes male as well as female wages. When both are controlled, welfare benefits have a slight positive
impact on female headship even in time series. The results demonstrate the importance of labor market
factors in explaining trends in female headship.Welfare Benefits and Female Headship in U.S. Time Series
Whether welfare benefits affect marriage and fertility decisions of the low-income population
has been the subject of much research. The substantial bias in the U.S. welfare system toward female-
headed families, relative to either married couples or single childless individuals, provides a clear
financial incentive for behavior that makes eligibility for welfare benefits more likely or that avoids the
loss of eligibility after it has been achieved, such as early nonmarital childbearing, postponement of
marriage, divorce, and postponement of remarriage.
The research literature through 1995 has been summarized by Moffitt (1998). The existing
literature typically uses data on women in different states with different welfare benefit levels and
correlates those benefits with womens’ family structure, usually in a regression context controlling for
other individual and state-level factors. A number of the studies also include data on individuals in
different states over time and examine the correlation between changes in benefit levels and changes in
family structure, again typically in a regression framework where state fixed effects are entered. Over 60
separate estimates of this type have been obtained in the literature, according to the Moffitt review.
Contrary to some other summaries of the evidence, the review revealed that the central tendency of this
cross-sectional evidence is that there are indeed effects of welfare on some aspects of family structure,
namely, marriage and nonmarital fertility. However, the review revealed that considerable unexplained
dispersion exists in the estimates across studies, leading to some disagreement about the validity of the
central tendency. Furthermore, disagreement remains about the magnitude of the effect across studies.
Nevertheless, despite differences, there is widespread agreement in the literature that the time-
series evidence does not support an effect of welfare benefits, since real benefits have been falling for
over 20 years—at least in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and now the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program—while female headship has been
increasing. Moreover, bringing other programs such as Food Stamps and Medicaid into the picture helps2
explain female headship increases in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when those programs were
introduced and solidified, but does less well in explaining headship growth in the late 1970s and early
1980s, when growth was still strong. Even the cross-sectional studies that have revealed the largest
magnitude of welfare effects do not contravene these time-series correlations, because virtually all of the
individual studies, including those with state fixed effects, enter year dummies into their regressions,
thereby removing the time-series correlation from the data.
From one perspective, there is no puzzle at all and no contradiction between the cross-sectional
and time-series evidence, simply because some forces not present in cross section may have been at work
in time series, forces which have pushed female headship up more than the falling welfare benefits have
pushed it down. Consequently, it is still possible that female headship might have risen even faster than it
did if benefits had not fallen. But this tidy explanation is tautological and lacks credibility unless the
other forces can be identified and it can be demonstrated empirically that they caused headship to rise.
This paper is directed at identifying those forces and focuses on labor market opportunity—as
proxied by wage rates—as the potential other force pushing female headship rates up. Wages and other
measures of labor market potential have played a central role in economic models of the family since the
work of Becker (1973, 1981) and hence may seem to be an overstudied source of the rise in female
headship. However, both the bulk of the theoretical work and most of the traditional empirical work on
the subject give too exclusive a role to the female wage rate and too minor a role to the male wage rate.
This paper shows that the male wage is an essential part of the story and must be included for the effects
of welfare benefits to be estimated correctly.
The role of male wages has not been completely ignored, however, with the work of Wilson
(1987) and Wilson and Neckerman (1986) also giving the role of males a central position in explanations
of the family structure decisions of disadvantaged women, although much of this work is concerned with
labor force and unemployment rates of men rather than with male wages per se. Several cross-sectional3
studies of welfare benefit effects also have controlled for both male and female wages (Danziger et al.,
1982; Hoffman and Duncan, 1988; Lichter, LeClere, and McLaughlin, 1991; Lichter, McLaughlin, and
Ribar, 1997; Schultz, 1994), generally finding significant effects of both. However, neither the work of
Wilson nor the cross-sectional studies are directed at the time-series issue and hence still leave
unresolved the inconsistency between the cross-sectional and time-series evidence that is the motivation
for this paper.
The results of the analysis indicate that the addition of female wages to a time-series headship
equation reverses the sign on the AFDC benefit from negative to positive and, even in specifications
where benefit effects are positive to begin with, makes them more positive. Adding the male wage to the
equation makes the benefit coefficient even more positive. The results thus offer a possible explanation
for the inconsistency between the cross-sectional and time-series correlations. Moreover, for both white
and black women it is demonstrated that the decline in the male wage for less-educated men has had
more of an effect on headship rates than any upward trend in female wages; thus male wages play a
critical role in time-series explanations of headship changes.
The next section of the paper briefly outlines an economic model of female headship which
incorporates wage and benefit effects in the simplest possible way. The subsequent, and longer, sections
of the paper consider the time-series empirical evidence on wage and benefit effects and whether
incorporating wages changes the sign of benefit effects.4
1Note that cohabitation, as well as marriage, is excluded in this definition. The census data used below will
not permit the separation of cohabitation and female headship, so the distinction is ignored here as well. In addition,
nothing in the basic economic model distinguishes cohabitation from marriage, although we will use the word
“marriage” instead of “union” because our data will only identify marriage. Also, no distinction is made between
female household headship and female family headship, i.e., whether the woman lives in a household of her own or
within a larger household, possibly headed by her parents.
2It is impossible to do justice to the enormous literature on the economics of marriage and fertility by
citation. For marriage, see the work of Becker (1973,1981) and the review paper of Weiss (1997). For fertility, see
the papers of Becker (1960) and Willis (1973 ) and the review paper by Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997).
3Although the model is neutral on the issue, the empirical evidence suggests that the time-series increase in
female headship is more a result of a decline in marriage than an increase in fertility, at least for the white
population, and hence a shift of childbearing from married to unmarried women (Smith, Morgan, and Koropeckyj-
Cox, 1996).
THE ROLE OF WAGES AND BENEFITS IN THE SIMPLE STATIC ECONOMIC MODEL
Female headship is defined as a family structure in which a woman lives with her own children
but without a partner.
1 The simplest static model, from Becker, defines the marriage decision as based on
utility differences between marriage to a particular potential mate or to a random draw from a set of
mates with the same characteristics. Conditional on the marriage decision, childbearing decisions are
made from standard utility maximization by balancing the utility gains against the marginal costs.
2
Because female headship is both a marriage and a fertility decision, headship is said to occur when the
woman chooses not to marry but to have children.
3
Assuming that women have individual utility functions containing as arguments leisure, the
number of children, other consumption goods, and marriage itself, a model which captures the relevant
considerations in minimal form is the following:
KM=1 = f(Wm,Wf,PK; Xm,Xf)( 1 )
KM=0 = g(Wf,PK,B; Xf)( 2 )
M* = VM=1(Wm,Wf,KM=1; Xm,Xf)  VM=0(Wf,KM=0,B; Xf)  C
(3)
M = 1   iff   M*0;   M = 0   iff   M*<05
4When the quality of children is introduced, even the “income effects” may be negative. See Becker and
Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973). See Becker (1965) for the basic household production model.
5We ignore the possibility of welfare benefits for married couples.
where M=1 if the woman is married and M=0 if not; Wm is the male wage rate offered in the market and
Wf is that for the female wage; PK is the money price of children; Xm are characteristics of potential male
partners and Xf are female characteristics; and B is the welfare benefit. Equations 1 and 2 are demand-
for-children equations conditional on marriage. In the married state, both wages have negative price
effects and positive income effects, but if women spend more time in childrearing than men, the female
wage will more likely have a net negative sign.
4 In the single state, specialization is more constricted and
income is lower, leading to less childbearing than in the married state, but the sign on the female wage is
still ambiguous. Welfare benefits, available only if not married,
5 have a positive effect on childbearing
not only from income effects but because they are tied to low levels of work effort.
Equation 3 portrays the utility difference between being married and being single as M*, which
is the difference between the female quasi-indirect utility functions VM, which are in turn conditioned on
the pre-optimized number of children, KM, but not on labor supply or other goods, minus a cost of
marriage, C (search as well as divorce costs). Although the decision problem is portrayed as if it were a
two-stage process of initially choosing the number of children a woman would have if she were married
and if she were not, and then choosing whether to marry or not on the basis of these values of K and the
other determinants of marriage, this is for expositional purposes only; the model instead considers the
decisions to be completely joint.
Wages in the marriage decision again have effects in different directions. An increase in the
female wage raises income in both married and unmarried states and hence has no effect on the gain from
marriage if utility is raised by the same amount in both, but increases that gain if marriage is a normal
good. However, an increase in the male wage only increases utility in the married state, thereby6
6Although awkward in many respects, this minimal model ignores the male utility gains from marriage. In a
more realistic model, both male and female need utility gains to marry, and the chosen leisure, child, and
consumption goods are the result of a collective decision mechanism involving both utility functions. However, the
model here still allows male leisure and consumption to be in the female utility function. Consequently,
complementaries between male and female leisure can give rise to gains from marriage even in this model; indeed,
this was the source of gains originally identified by Becker (1973).
7The two-stage portrayal of the decision process obscures this specialization effect to some extent, because
the joint production of children, leisure, and other consumption is not portrayed in its fully joint form. The way the
model is written, the demand-for-children equation (equation 1) already incorporates the specialization decisions in
the married state.
increasing the gains from marriage unambiguously.
6 But the effect of wages on marriage works through
the choice of K as well, and it is here that the classic gains to marriage from specialization and division
of labor (i.e., increasing returns) occur in this model. Gains from specialization become greater as the gap
between the two wage rates widens, thus giving the wage ratio Wf/Wm a central role.
7 Assuming Wm>Wf,
an increase in Wf/Wm will reduce the gains to marriage and marriage rates will fall. Finally, note that
welfare benefits appear only in the unmarried state and thus have an unambiguous negative effect on
gains to marriage.
Ignoring PK, the model contains only three key determining variables—the two wages and the
welfare benefit (nontransfer, nonwage income is also ignored)—in addition to the exogenous
characteristics Xm and Xf. Defining F=1 if a woman chooses not to marry (M=0) and to have children
(KM=0>0) and F=0 if not—that is, a female headship indicator variable—we will work empirically with
the reduced-form expression
E(F|Wf,Wm,B,X f,X m) = G[ + (Wf/Wm) + (Wm+Wf) + B + Xf + Xm]( 4 )
where G is a probability distribution function mapping the latent index inside the brackets into the unit
interval. The two wage rates could be entered separately or in a variety of alternative functional forms
but are entered here in ratio and additive form to assist in interpretating effects of specialization, in the
case of the ratio, and income effects, in the case of the wage sum. Thus we expect  > 0 and  < 0. The7
price-income distinction is not completely clean since both variables capture different types of price and
income effects to some extent; consequently, the expected signs are not completely unambiguous as well.
However, we expect  > 0 unambiguously, and the question in the analysis is whether the
omission of the two wage variables from the equation falsely leads to an estimated  < 0, as one observes
as a raw correlation in the time-series data.
It is worth emphasizing that in this model the reason that marriage does not occur is because
there may be no gains from marriage. Either utility is lowered by being married or the costs of marriage
exceed the benefits. This view is at odds with traditional equilibrium models of the marriage market in
which equal numbers of men and women always marry, because there are always gains to specialization,
even at very low wages. The introduction of costs to marriage, and different utilities in the married and
unmarried states, however, implies that the gains to specialization at low wages may be outweighed by
negative factors. This model also does not need to rely on sex-ratio explanations to explain nonmarital
fertility.
Clearly a model this simple misses many important factors. Other gains to marriage such as those
from public goods, from alleviation of imperfect capital markets, and from risk pooling (Weiss, 1997) are
ignored. The general equilibrium nature of the marriage market is ignored and consequently so is the
importance of imbalance of the two sexes; relatedly, the alternative to marriage is not necessarily being
single but rather searching for another partner. Search considerations and matching considerations in the
marriage market, and other dynamics, are also ignored in favor of the simplicity of the static model.
Whether incorporation of these factors would materially change the expected wage and benefit signs in a
female headship equation is unclear, however.8
8We also impose the requirement that each race-cohort-year cell have a minimum of 100 observations, a
restriction that is binding only for the black sample. There are 273 cells for the white population and 218 cells for the
black population; these constitute the number of observations for the grouped regressions. Note as well that we use
female household headship rather than female family headship; the latter was tested, with no difference in results.
We ignore husband-wife differences in education, and assume that most marriages take place within the same, broad,
less-than-high-school-education group.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
Given the focus of the analysis on explaining time-series trends in female headship, and also in
determining whether the incorporation of wage effects resolves the inconsistency in the sign of welfare
benefit effects in past cross-sectional and time-series studies, we follow an empirical strategy of focusing
primarily on time-series variation in F, Wf, Wm, and B. Cross-sectional variables will be incorporated to
some extent by stratifying the analysis by educational level and age but, conditional on education and
age, only time-series, aggregate variation in the variables will be utilized. Cross-sectional variation in B
(e.g., across geographic areas) is intentionally ignored in favor of a more purely time-series exercise.
We employ data from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1968–1996. From each
CPS we select all men and women 18–65 with less than a high school education, and we stratify the
sample in each year by birth cohort (grouped into 5-year birth year intervals). We also stratify the sample
into two races, white and black, and do not examine other race groups. For each race and each birth
cohort group in each year, we calculate a mean male wage rate, a mean female wage rate, and a female-
headship rate.
8 The latter is equal to the fraction of women in the group who have children but are not
married. The wage rate is the average weekly wage (annual earnings divided by annual weeks of work) in
real 1992 dollars over the previous calendar year, taken over workers in that year (tests for selection bias
are also conducted). Aggregate national real AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid monthly benefits are
available as well, and we compute a weighted sum of the three to arrive at an overall measure of welfare9
9We use actual benefits rather than guarantee levels because the two are highly correlated. The three-benefit
sum equals the sum of the AFDC benefit and the Food Stamp benefit plus .368 of the Medicaid benefit; the .368
adjustment is for the in-kind nature of the Medicaid program. We also test AFDC alone and AFDC plus Food Stamp
benefits alone.
generosity.
9 Thus we have a time series of data on female headship rates, male wages, female wages, and
welfare benefits for the less-educated population over the period 1968–1996, stratified by birth cohort.
Table A1 shows the means of the variables.
We estimate a linearized version of equation 4 on these group means:
Fct =  + (Wf/Wm)ct + (Wm + Wf)ct + Bt + Agect + ct (5)
for birth cohort c in year t, where now all variables are means over individuals in a cohort-year (ct)
group. The age of the group is the only variable controlled in the regression in addition to wages and
benefits.
Equation 5 is extremely parsimonious and does not attempt to account for the many other
changes in the social, economic, and policy environment that occurred over the 1968–1996 period. Some
of the other forces omitted have already been mentioned (e.g., sex ratios), but there were also changes in
contraceptive technology and the legal environment governing marriage, fertility, and abortion. Policy
variables that are particularly important in addition are changes in other aspects of the welfare system
(i.e., welfare reform), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), child support enforcement, and the tax
penalty to marriage. The aggregate time-series approach here could make very little progress on
controlling for these factors because there are only 29 annual observations in the data. The aim of the
analysis here is, therefore, not to isolate the effect of welfare benefits in time series from the effects of
these and other omitted factors but, more modestly, simply to determine whether the addition of the two
wage variables in equation 5 changes the sign or magnitude of the coefficient on B and hence whether the
time-series evidence is consistent with a welfare effect at the simplest level.10
We apply generalized least squares (GLS) to equation 5 to adjust for the effect of grouping on
sampling variance by using the number of observations in each cell; we assume the existence of a random
year component in the error term when making this grouping adjustment. The random year effect is
important because the key regressor of interest—the welfare benefit—varies only over time and not
cross-sectionally, and hence implicitly has only 29 degrees of freedom (the number of years in the data)
and not the greater degrees of freedom suggested by the number of grouped observations (273 and 218
for the two race groups; see footnote 8). Ignoring the presence of a random year effect could result in
seriously understated standard errors on the benefit coefficient. The Appendix discusses the GLS
procedure.
Figure 1 shows the mean female headship rate by race taken over women 18–65 in each year of
the CPS. As expected, the rate has risen monotonically over time (not shown graphically is the change in
the composition of that trend, from divorce and separation in the early period to never-married single
mothers in the later period). Figure 2 shows the trends in welfare benefits—AFDC alone (bottom line),
AFDC plus Food Stamps (middle line), and AFDC plus Food Stamps plus Medicaid (top line). Benefits
rose in the early period, particularly if Food Stamps and Medicaid are included because these programs
were being introduced and expanded over that period. Thus the crude correlation between benefits and
headship in this period is positive. But after approximately 1976 all benefit series reversed growth or
slowed down. AFDC benefits, which fell monotonically after 1976, display a different pattern from
benefits that include both Food Stamps and Medicaid, which fell between 1976 and 1982 but then rose
again and subsequently fell again. The expansions of Medicaid are primarily responsible for this
difference. Even for this more comprehensive measure of the benefit, however, there has been a drastic
overall slowdown in growth after 1976, and consequently the crude positive correlation between benefits


















































AFDC benefit AFDC & Food Stamps benefit AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid benefit13
Table 1 confirms these graphical trends with regression results. The table shows the coefficients
on Bt from equation 5, omitting the wage variables, for different measures of the benefit and for different
time periods. Both over all years and over the subperiod from 1976 forward, the AFDC benefit
coefficient is negative. When Food Stamps are included, the coefficient is positive overall but negative in
the period after 1976. When Medicaid benefits are included, the coefficients are positive in both time
frames but weaker and insignificant after 1976.
ESTIMATION RESULTS
White Population
The results for the white population are prefigured in simple graphical form in Figure 3. The
upper three lines of the figure show the life-cycle profiles of female headship for three different birth
cohorts (1930–34, 1940–44, and 1950–54) and indicate that headship rates have been rising over time, at
least at young ages. The middle three lines in the figure show the life-cycle profiles of female weekly
wages for the same three cohorts and indicate, interestingly, extreme stability in that wage. Contrary to
the conventional wisdom that female wages have been uniformly rising over time, real wages have not
risen over this period for the less-educated population. The lack of growth reflects a general deterioration
in the labor market for less-skilled workers over the last 20 years. Clearly, then, the female wage is
unlikely to be by itself a strong explanator for the growth in headship for this population.
The three lines in the lower portion of the figure show life-cycle profiles of the female-to-male
wage ratio, and here we see growth in the ratio over the three cohorts. Indirectly these results imply,
when combined with the lack of a female wage trend, a decline in the level of the real male wage for the
less-educated population. This too has been well-documented in the recent literature on the U.S. labor
market and contrasts sharply with wages for the more-educated male population, which have been
trending strongly upward (e.g., Levy and Murnane, 1992; Katz and Autor, 1999). For present purposes,14
TABLE 1
Regression Coefficients on Welfare Benefits without Wage Variables













Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * designates significance at 10 percent level. All equations are
estimated on the white population with less than 12 years of education and all include a fifth-order
polynomial in age (the centered age of the birth cohort in each year). All coefficients are multiplied by
1000.Figure 3. Female Headship, Female Wage, and Female-Male Wage 
















































































1930-34 cohort female head rate 1940-44 cohort female head rate 1950-54 cohort female head rate
1930-34 cohort female wage ratio 1940-44 cohort female wage ratio 1950-54 cohort female wage ratio
1930-34 cohort wage rate 1940-44 cohort wage rate 1950-54 cohort wage rate16
10Given the grouped nature of the data, the equation is estimated with least squares rather than with grouped
probit or logit.
the rise in the wage ratio implies a reduction in the gains to specialization and division of labor and hence
a reduction in the gains to marriage, and this is consistent with the growth of female headship. But it is
important to note that it is the result of changes over time in the male wage, not the female wage—that is,
it is changes in the male wage that have influenced female headship according to these results.
Finally, although it is not shown in the figure, it follows from the two sets of wage plots that the
sum of wages must have fallen (constant female wage, declining male wage), leading to income effects
which should also lead to a decline in marriage and an increase in female headship. Thus both wage
variables in equation 5 can be seen to have moved in a direction against marriage.
Table 2 shows the results of estimation of several specifications of equation 5.
10 Column 1
includes only the welfare benefit—the AFDC benefit alone, in this case—and no other variables except
age (coefficients not shown). As expected, the AFDC benefit exhibits a significantly negative effect on
headship, inconsistent with cross-sectional evidence. However, when the female-male wage ratio is
added to the equation, as in column 2, the sign on the AFDC benefit flips around to positive and is
statistically significant, though only barely by conventional criteria. The coefficient on the wage ratio
itself is positive and significant, as expected from the Figure 3. Column 3 adds the wage sum to the
equation, and finds it to have a negative and significant sign, which is consistent with the simple
economic model—even holding the ratio of male and female wages fixed, higher levels of wages result in
more marriage. The coefficient on the welfare benefit almost doubles when the wage sum is added, a
large increase in its magnitude; thus when both “price” and “income” wage effects are controlled,
welfare benefits become increasingly consistent with the cross-sectional evidence. Columns 4 and 5 add,
in turn, Food Stamp benefits and Medicaid benefits to the welfare-benefit sum; these are more accurate17
TABLE 2
Coefficients on Benefit and Wage Variables in Headship Regressions:
White Women 18–65, 1968–1996








AFDC + Food Stamp
Benefit
— — — 0.720
(0.086)
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Notes: n = 273. Standard errors in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the 10 percent level. All
equations are estimated on the population with less than 12 years of education and all include a fifth-
order polynomial in age (the centered age of the birth cohort in each year). All coefficients are multiplied
by 1000 except that on the wage ratio.18
11The finding that female headship is a two-variable, not a one-variable, model is quite similar to the
celebrated finding of Mincer (1962) that reconciling the cross-sectional and time-series relationship between labor
force participation and wages of married women requires the introduction of the wage of the husband.
representations of what the welfare system offers. Benefit effects are, on average, larger and more
positive in this case than for the AFDC benefit alone.
These results constitute the basic findings of the analysis for white women, and will be shown to
hold up under a variety of sensitivity tests and alternative formulations. The analysis, as a whole, thus
strongly supports the importance of both female and male wages in affecting marriage and female
headship decisions.
Table 3 reinforces the importance of including both male and female wages by specifying them
in a more conventional linear manner. In column 1, only the female wage is included, along with the
three-benefit sum. The wage coefficient is statistically insignificant, not surprisingly in light of Figure 3.
A misleading conclusion would be drawn from this result that female wages do not matter. Column 2
shows that this is not the case when the male wage is entered in addition, which makes the female wage
coefficient now positive and significant; the male wage coefficient is negative and significant.
11 The
representation of wage effects in this way rather than as wage ratio and wage sum is fairly arbitrary and a
matter of convenience, for they tell the same story—in column 2, an increase in the female wage and a
decrease in the male wage (thus holding the sum constant) increases female headship, whereas an
increase in both wages in the same amount decreases it, as implied by the fact that .409 is greater in
absolute value than .397. Finally, columns 3 and 4 replace the benefit sum with year dummies, in one
case entering the two wages separately and in the other entering the wage ratio and wage sum; this
specification is intended to test whether the specific form of welfare benefits or of other period effects19
TABLE 3
Coefficients on Benefit and Wage in Headship Regressions:
White Women 18–65, 1968–1996













Wf/Wm —— — 0.190
(0.039)
Wm + Wf —— — -0.181
(0.045)







Year dummies n n y y
Notes: n = 273. Standard errors in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the 10 percent level except
that on female wage in column 1. All equations are estimated on the population with less than 12 years of
education and all include a fifth-order polynomial in age (the centered age of the birth cohort in each
year). All coefficients are multiplied by 1000 except that on the wage ratio.20
12Some cross-sectional variation still exists in the data arising from the cohort variation (or, holding year
fixed, age variation). In a pure time-series analysis, year dummies would absorb all variation and leave nothing for
wages. In the year fixed-effects specification in columns 3 and 4, on the other hand, cross-cohort wage differences
are correlated with cross-cohort headship differences.
matters to the wage results. The answer is that it does not, for the wage coefficients maintain their
previous pattern in this case as well.
12
Another method of testing for the effect of the inclusion of wages on the estimated effect of
benefits on headship is to ask whether the model implies that female headship went up more in the late
1970s and 1980s than would have been expected from the influence of wages alone. This is a necessary
consequence of the results, for headship did increase over the period and benefits fell, as shown in
Figures 1 and 2. To address this question directly, we estimate a model with only the two wage
variables—the wage ratio and the wage sum—but without the benefit variable (the age variables are also
included). If the interpretation given thus far is correct, the time series of headship rates predicted from
this regression should overestimate the actual rate of female headship over the later years of the period.
Figure 4 shows the results graphically. The predicted headship rates from the model display some
fluctuation but exhibit an unmistakable upward trend that grows at a faster rate than actual headship, as
can be seen from the top two lines in the figure. Although the level of headship is generally
underpredicted, it is overpredicted for a few years in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The bottom line in
the figure shows the pattern of residuals from the equation (i.e., the difference in the top two lines). The
residuals show, correspondingly, a monotonic downward trend (albeit with fluctuation) after around
1974. The residual plot is, indeed, of almost the exact general shape as the plot of AFDC benefits and
AFDC plus Food Stamp benefits in Figure 2. Thus, confirming the regression analysis, the inclusion of
female and male wages in the model leaves an unexplained gap in actual and predicted female headship
that is consistent with the time-series patterns of welfare benefit changes.Figure 4. Actual, Predicted, and Residual Female Headship Rate 
















































actual female head rate predicted female head rate residual22
13In a time-series analysis, where no cross-area variation is used, identification of selection effects is
difficult. The selectivity effect in the wage equation is identified by the assumption that unemployment affects the
probability of working but not wages directly, an assumption based on the research literature on the effects of the
business cycle on the real wage which shows that real wages are fairly cyclically insensitive. The wage coefficients in
the headship equation are identified by the inclusion of polynomial year effects in the wage equation and not in the
headship equation, thus implicitly allowing wage effects to pick up departures from the trends in the other variables
in the equation (benefits and age).
Finally, we conduct three sensitivity tests on the model. The first two examine whether the
estimates of benefit effects are stronger among subgroups that are more likely to be affected by welfare
benefits and weaker among subgroups that are less likely to be affected by the welfare system. If the
effects being estimated are completely spurious and a result of some more general trend, the benefit
effects should not vary in the manner to be expected if they are truly reflecting welfare effects. Table 4
shows in its first column the estimates from column 5 in Table 2, as baseline. The second column shows
the effect of estimating the equation only on young women, who are the most likely to be welfare
recipients and hence to respond; indeed, the welfare benefit coefficient grows larger for this group. The
third column shows estimates on the sample of women with education greater than high school, who
should be expected to respond less to changes in welfare benefits; indeed, the benefit coefficient drops
sharply in this case.
The final column tests whether using a selectivity-bias-corrected wage, instead of the wage for
workers only, affects the results. Female employment rates have risen over time and this could be
expected to artificially lower mean female wages, on the presumption that most women entering the labor
market have lower wages than those previously working. Although it is not obvious how this problem
might affect benefit coefficients, it should be tested nevertheless. The results show that the benefit
coefficients are larger than in the basic model (as are the wage coefficients) but the sign, significance,
and order of magnitude are the same. These results are only suggestive, since they rely on identification
assumptions that may be in error, but they do provide at least one piece of evidence on the robustness of
the benefit results to the problem of selectively missing wages.
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TABLE 4
Coefficients on Wage Ratio, Wage Sum, and Benefit Variables in Headship Regressions
































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients significant at the 10 perent level. All equations are
estimated on the population with less than 12 years of education except column 3, and all include a fifth-
order polynomial in age (the centered age of the birth cohort in each year). Wage sum and benefit
coefficients multiplied by 1000.
aAge less than or equal to 40.
bUnemployment rate identifies selection bias in wage equation; year polynomials identify wage
coefficients.24
Black Population
The results for black women will be discussed within the framework and method already
illustrated with the results for white women. Figure 5 shows the life course trends in headship, female
wages, and the female-male wage ratio for the same three cohorts as in Figure 3 but for black women.
Headship has also risen among black women, with the effects concentrated at younger ages (less than
40). Female wage rates have risen slightly for black women but the magnitude of the growth has not been
large, and hence is unlikely to provide an explanation by itself for the trend in headship. The change in
the female-male wage ratio is, contrary to that of white women, more mixed in its trend. There has been a
rise in that ratio for the most recent cohort shown in the figure, at early ages, but the noise in the data
renders this trend not completely clearcut. Smoothing over the fluctuations, however, demonstrates that
there has been an upward trend in this ratio for black women as for white women. Moreover, the decline
in the black male wage that is implied by the combination of the female wage and female-male wage
ratios in Figure 5 is particularly strong in the early ages (35 and less), which is also the age range in
which headship among the black population has risen the most (see top lines). The age correspondence
between these trends is somewhat closer than it was for the white population, for whom male wages have
been dropped at ages somewhat later than the ages at which headship has risen (see Figure 3).
The first column of Table 5 shows the results of the basic model for black women. The wage
ratio effect has a smaller magnitude than for white women but is still positive and significant. The effect
of the wage sum is also negative and significant and of approximately the same magnitude as for white
women. However, the benefit coefficient is not only again positive and significant but is much larger than
that for the white population, implying a large effect of welfare benefits. This finding is consistent with
the higher welfare participation rates in welfare among the black population than among the white
(Gottschalk and Moffitt, forthcoming).Figure 5. Female Headship, Female Wage, and Female-Male Wage 












































































1930-34 cohort female head rate 1940-44 cohort female head rate 1950-54 cohort female head rate
1930-34 cohort female wage ratio 1940-44 cohort female wage ratio 1950-54 cohort female wage ratio
1930-34 cohort wage rate 1940-44 cohort wage rate 1950-54 cohort wage rate26
TABLE 5
Coefficients on Wage Ratio, Wage Sum, and Benefit Variables in Headship Regressions























Notes: n = 207. Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients significant at the 10 percent level. All
equations are estimated on the population with less than 12 years of education except column 3, and all
include a fifth-order polynomial in age (the centered age of the birth cohort in each year). Wage sum and
benefit coefficients multiplied by 1000.
aAge less than or equal to 40.27
14Because of small sample sizes, the year-by-year plots show considerable fluctuation, making the figure
difficult to view. The lines have therefore been smoothed for this group.
This stronger benefit effect can be seen in Figure 6, where the predicted and actual headship
rates from a model without benefits are shown for black women.
14 The residual plot at the bottom now
shows a strong correspondence with the pattern of the AFDC/Food-Stamp/Medicaid plot shown in Figure
2. The residual rose more strongly and later than for whites, all the way through the early 1980s, and did
not fall as strongly or as rapidly thereafter as for whites. This residual plot is still not exactly in
correspondence with the welfare benefit plot, but it more closely follows it—at least for the most
comprehensive benefit level—than for whites. This is what leads to the stronger estimated effect for
black women.
The rest of the columns in Table 5 show sensitivity testing for the black female results. When the
analysis is restricted to younger women, the coefficient on the welfare benefit becomes even more
positive than in the basic model. When the analysis is restricted only to more-educated women, the
benefit coefficient falls by 50 percent and becomes insignificant. The benefit effects are concentrated in
the groups with the highest welfare participation rates, thus militating against the hypothesis that the
estimated effects are spurious and the result of general trends.
CONCLUSIONS
Time-series analysis has been relatively ignored in the literature on the effects of welfare benefits
on female headship and nonmarital fertility. The relatively low number of degrees of freedom and the
plethora of competing explanations from multiple changes in the market and society in time series make
estimation with cross-sectional data naturally more attractive, and hence cross-sectional analysis should
and will no doubt continue as the dominant mode of research. However, the time-series trend in female
headship has dominated most public discussions of welfare effects and it is therefore important toFigure 6. Actual, Predicted, and Residual Female Headship Rate 














































actual female head rate predicted female head rate residual29
establish a possible explanation for that trend which is consistent with the cross-sectional evidence and
which allows both benefits and other factors to play a role.
This analysis has focused exclusively on the capability of male and female wage rates to provide,
on their own and ignoring all other time-series factors, an explanation for the upward trend in headship
and for the inconsistency in unadjusted benefit-headship correlations between the two types of data. The
results for both the white and black less-educated populations show that wages can provide such an
explanation, in the sense that when both female and male wages are controlled in a time-series headship
regression, there is an unexplained residual that follows roughly the same time-series pattern as that of
welfare benefits. Other time-series variables besides welfare benefits may follow this trend; however, the
analysis is nevertheless consistent with benefits having played a role. Even without assigning benefits as
the major factor in explaining the residual, however, the results strongly suggest that labor market factors
rather than governmental policy may have been responsible for the secular rise in female headship in the





Generalized Least Squares (GLS) Procedure
The assumed model is
yigt = Xigt + igt (A-1)
igt = 	t + 
igt (A-2)
for individual i in cohort-year group gt. We assume E(	t) = E(
igt) = E(	t
igt) = 0 and   and
. As noted in the text, one of the regressors (the welfare benefit) varies only over t.
We estimate the model in two stages. First we estimate the grouped regression
where the bars denote means taken over i within a gt group, by ordinary least squares (OLS) to produce
the coefficient estimate bols. We use the microdata for each i to compute residuals
eigt = Yigt - Xigtbols (A-4)
and we then estimate the variance components using the formulas
where M is the number of gt groups, ngt is the number of observations in group gt, N is the grand sample
size, K is the number of regressors, and   is the unweighted average of the ngt. Equation A-5 estimates
the variance of the within component as the unweighted average of the estimated within variances for
each of the gt groups, with a degrees-of-freedom adjustment. Equation A-6 estimates the variance of the32
(A-7)
between component in the traditional way by subtracting the variance of the mean of the within
component from the between variance of the residuals. The average group sample size is used to scale
down the within variance.
In the second stage, recognizing that the variance of the error term in A-3 is 
we reestimate A-3 with weighted least squares using the inverse of the square root of the estimates of this
variance as weights and using the estimates of the two error component variances obtained from the
individual data to estimate the variance in A-7.
As Dickens (1990) has noted, if ngt and   are sufficiently large, the variance of the error term in
A-3 is essentially homoskedastic and hence the GLS procedure will not produce standard errors very
different from those of OLS. Our estimates of GLS and OLS standard errors turned out to be extremely
close to one another, and this appears to be the reason (large cell sample sizes and relatively large
random component variances).TABLE A1
Means of the Variables in the Analysis
White Women Black Women
Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Female Headship (F) 0.096 0.058 0.001 0.217 0.253 0.123 0.008 0.506
Female Weekly Wage (Wf) 201 35 71 253 183 41 78 307
Male Weekly Wage (Wm) 375 91 88 504 317 77 86 425
Wf/Wm 0.555 0.088 0.410 0.871 0.604 0.160 0.384 1.859
Wm + Wf 577 123 161 732 500 108 165 706
AFDC Benefit 158 15 125 178 164 9 139 178
AFDC+Food Stamp Benefit 211 14 175 234 214 15 175 234
AFDC+Food Stamp+
Medicaid Benefit 284 29 195 314 278 30 195 311
Notes: n = 273 for white women, 207 for black women. Population includes all women with less than 12 years schooling and in cohort-year cells
with at least 100 observations. All wage and benefit figures in 1992 constant dollars. All welfare benefits are monthly.     35
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